IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
PENDLETON DIVISION

OREGON FIREARMS FEDERATION, )
INC. an Oregon public benefit corporation; BRAD LOHREY,
SHERMAN COUNTY SHERIFF; and
ADAM JOHNSON, an individual
Plaintiffs, v.

KATE BROWN, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF OREGON, in her official capacity; and ELLEN ROSENBLUM, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF OREGON, in her official capacity,

Defendants.

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER HEARING
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THE HONORABLE KARIN J. IMMERGUT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
PORTLAND DIVISION

MARK FITZ, GRAYGUNS, INC.; G4 )
ARCHERY, LLC; SECOND AMENDMENT FOUNDATION; and FIREARMS
POLICY COALITION, INC.,
Plaintiffs,

## v.

ELLEN ROSENBLUM, in her official capacity as Attorney
General of the State of
Oregon; and TERRI DAVIE, in
her official capacity as Superintendent of the Oregon State Police,

Defendants.

## TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER HEARING <br> TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS <br> BEFORE THE HONORABLE KARIN J. IMIMERGUT <br> UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
(December 2, 2022)
(In open court:)
THE COURT: Good morning, everyone. Please be
seated. And let me first just go over some court ground rules. Obviously, no phones may be on in court, and this also holds true for the overflow courtroom. You may not have any phones off -- if anything buzzes or makes any funny sounds or the court security folks or marshals notice that you're on your phones, I'm asking them to confiscate your phones, and you will get them back at the end of the hearing.

So no recording, other than the official recording here by my court reporter, is allowed. So I appreciate you're following that whether you're in this courtroom or the adjacent courtroom.

So I wanted to first call the case and then talk about my plan for this proceeding. We're here on the record in the case of Oregon Firearms Federation, Inc., et al. V. Brown, et al., which is Case 22-cv-01815.

We're also here on Fitz, et al. v. Rosenblum, et al., which is Case 22-cv-01859.

In these cases, the parties have agreed to combine the TRO or temporary restraining order hearing together, which was the time already set in the Oregon Firearms Federation case, and the court agreed to do that. And so that is my plan.

Let me have counsel first state your appearances for the record.

First, for plaintiff.
MR. KAEMPF: Your Honor, I am John Kaempf for the plaintiffs. And let me also introduce who will be addressing other secondary issues. With me is Mr. Leonard Williamson.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Good morning, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you.
Now, it's my understanding Mr. Williamson is part of the amici or amicus counsel, or he's co-counsel with you?

MR. KAEMPF: He's co-counsel with me.
THE COURT: Understood.
Okay. And who else do you have at counsel table?
MR. SERRANO: Yes, ma'am. Pete Serrano and
Karen Osborne on behalf of Amici Silent Majority Foundation.
THE COURT: Thank you very much. I do note that just counsel of record on the individual cases will be the ones to argue here today.

And, Mr. Kaempf, you look confused.
MR. KAEMPF: Oh, if it's okay, Your Honor -- of course, we want to play by the rules -- what we had divided up -- Mr. Williamson and I -- is he's going to, if you'll allow live testimony, he would -- he'll handle that specific witness, if that's okay.

THE COURT: I'm not taking live testimony today.

MR. KAEMPF: Okay.
THE COURT: So I'll talk about that in a minute. So thank you.

MR. KAEMPF: Okay.
THE COURT: Then for -- let me go to the, actually, other -- Mr. Buchal, I see you on the video. I know you are here on the Fitz case. If you would state your appearance, please.

MR. BUCHAL: Yes. James Buchal appearing for --
THE COURT: Mr. Buchal, we can't hear you.
MR. BUCHAL: Oh, dear.
Can you hear me now?
THE COURT: I hear you better.
Can folks in the courtroom hear?
MR. BUCHAL: I will speak loudly, Your Honor. I'm sorry that didn't get picked up before the hearing. I'm here on behalf of the plaintiffs in the Fitz case. With me in the virtual courtroom is Mr. William Bergstrom of the law firm of Cooper \& Kirk, PLLC, in Washington, who was admitted yesterday pro hac. Our intention was that he would argue the merits of the TRO and I would address the question of consolidation.

And we have some late-breaking news on that when the time is appropriate.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Buchal. Mr. Bergstrom, did you want to state your appearance as

MR. BERGSTROM: Thank you, Your Honor. Good morning.
Will Bergstrom for the plaintiffs in the Fitz case.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
And for the defendants.
MR. MARSHALL: Good morning, Your Honor.
Brian Marshall for the defendants.
MR. WILSON: Good morning, Your Honor. Harry Wilson, Special Assistant Attorney General, for defendants.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
Let me clarify the purpose of today's hearing, and it is to address the multiple plaintiffs' applications for a temporary restraining order to keep Measure 114 from going into effect on December 8, 2022. This is the hearing to allow oral argument on your respective motions and responses. It is not the time for live witnesses. You should have submitted declarations in support of your positions if you wanted to rely on evidence, and that is the record that $I$ will consider in evaluating the TROs.

There will be a time for a preliminary injunction hearing. I want to have counsel confer about the schedule for that. And then if you do want live testimony for that hearing, I do expect that you'll give notice to the other side of any witnesses two weeks in advance, and there will be an opportunity to take any depositions. So I do need you to
confer on that.
And I'll give you a deadline at the end of this hearing for basically a -- submitting your proposal of when you want to have the preliminary injunction briefing scheduled, and then you can propose a time for a hearing as well, consistent with my schedule.

So, again, then let me talk a little bit about my plan for today. Actually, before I do that, the purpose of the preliminary injunction hearing is so that I can have a full record, and we'll talk, I think, a little bit today about what a full record looks like in the post-Bruen regime. So we'll discuss that. But I do want you to confer after this hearing and give me a proposed schedule for the preliminary injunction hearing.

What I want to do today is to start by asking both -well, clarify the scope of my understanding of what's really at issue here and then ask each side some questions. And then I'll allow each side time to argue their position. It seemed to me reasonable to have both plaintiffs for the respective cases to have 20 minutes maximum apiece for argument. I'll give, then, the defendants 30 minutes to argue -- again, I have your briefing -- about anything you want to highlight in your argument or clarify based on some of my questions, and then I'll give the plaintiffs five minutes of rebuttal each.

So let me focus now on clarifying the scope of this
hearing. It seems to me, based on the briefing, that the primary issue raised in both cases is about whether the Second Amendment protects magazine capacity; and, specifically, does Measure 114's restriction on magazines containing more than 10 rounds of ammunition infringe upon a law-abiding citizen's rights under the Second Amendment to bear arms for self-defense. So that is my understanding of the crux of this dispute and the issues being raised.

It is my impression from the briefing that Ballot Measure 114's permit requirement is not really at issue in this TRO because plaintiff has not -- Plaintiff OFF -- I'll refer to Oregon Federation of Firearms -- Oregon Firearms Federation -doesn't provide any legal argument about the permitting issue. And the Fitz TRO isn't challenging the permit requirement at all.

So I would like plaintiff -- and why don't I have you, Mr. Kaempf, explain to me whether I'm incorrect on my assessment of what's at issue.

MR. KAEMPF: Well, Your Honor, I hate to start a hearing this way, but you are incorrect on that, respectfully.

As we made a record of in our briefs, we also challenge the permits to purchase clauses of Measure 114. For shorthand, Your Honor, I -- people may call that "PTP," permits to purchase. And also I might just call it "114" for short. Obviously, you'll understand. And as we make clear in our
motion, we challenge and seek to enjoin all -- all of 114, all of its provisions.

Now, two points --
THE COURT: Where is that in your legal argument? MR. KAEMPF: That is in the briefs.

And I wanted to say to Your Honor an initial point. May I please? You said that nothing was cited, but there are only two cases in the country. Federal district judges just like you that have addressed permits to -- permits challenges brought by clients like mine. And in both cases -- one, the Wesson case; and, two, the Richmond case -- the courts granted an injunction against the permits to purchase. Those two cases are in my brief.

And what's interesting is those two cases -- and you'll notice Governor Brown doesn't cite anything going the other way because there isn't. Those were both cited even before Bruen. They said, "No, permits to purchase are unconstitutional." So we challenge that as well.

THE COURT: Okay. So let me ask you -- why don't I start off, then, with my questions for you.

Well, actually, before I ask my questions, Mr. Bergstrom, or, Mr. Buchal, is there anything that I have missed in terms of the crux of what your briefing is about?

MR. BERGSTROM: No, Your Honor. Your summary is accurate as to us.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
From defendants' perspective, is there anything that I've missed in terms of the -- what you see as the critical issues here?

MR. MARSHALL: Your Honor, no. We think that this case is primarily -- or this hearing is primarily about the large-capacity magazine issue. We read the Oregon Firearms Federation plaintiffs as raising a purely facial challenge to the permits to purchase. We think that that is rejected in footnote 9 of Bruen; and, therefore, there's not grounds for a temporary restraining order.

Just in candor to the Court -- it's a bit off topic -- I think that the Eyre plaintiffs filed last night a different case with a different preliminary injunction motion, and I also believe that Mr. Buchal is planning to file a case on behalf of another group of plaintiffs at some point that will raise permit to purchase issues.

But here I think there's a -- just simply a facial challenge, which we address in our papers.

THE COURT: Okay. So let me start, then, Mr. Kaempf -- and am I pronouncing your name correctly?

MR. KAEMPF: Yes, it is, Your Honor. That's actually -- usually they don't get it right; so I appreciate it. It's pronounced "Kempf."
THE COURT: "Kempf"? Okay.

MR. KAEMPF: Yes.
THE COURT: Mr. Kaempf, I just want to ask you -- I want to start with just some questions for you, and then I'll ask some questions of defendants, and then you'll have a chance to have your argument.

So you've made it clear now that you still are challenging the permitting requirement. It seems to me that the -- Bruen makes very clear that the "shall issue permits" restrictions are constitutional and have -- there are 43 states that have "shall issue permit" requirements. Bruen, of course, involved a different kind of permitting requirement that left discretion to the permitting agency.

Justice Kavanaugh in his dissent says the kinds of requirements that would be constitutional would be things like fingerprinting, background checks, mental health record checks, firearms training, among other possible requirements.

Isn't that what the permitting requirement in Measure 114 does?

MR. KAEMPF: No, Your Honor. If I could, respectfully, one, Justice Kavanaugh concurred; so he was with the majority in Bruen. And when he addressed the "shall issue" states and the 43 states that have "shall issue" laws, this was the key point. He said in those states, unlike 114, they have, quote, "Objective licensing requirements." Okay. But the problem is 114 says, "We'll only issue a permit to purchase if
an applicant does not present reasonable grounds for a permit agent to conclude that the applicant has been or is reasonably likely to be a danger to self or others."

So see how it's requiring the proof of a negative, in essence, in 114? Unlike what Justice Kavanaugh said in his concurrence, it's, "Well, you're not going to get it unless you show you won't -- you -- that you don't present reasonable grounds to deny that," and that turns the Second Amendment on its head.

And I also want to note, Your Honor, it's -- it uses the phrase "permit agents." Permit agents are going to apply that standard, which is not objective. Exactly the opposite of what Justice Kavanaugh's concurrence in Bruen said was okay.

It opens the door to a -- who knows? A permit agent. I'm sorry. That just sounds a little Orwellian, if that's the phrase. "Well, let me see. I don't think you presented reasonable grounds, John Q. Public; so we're going to deny this," and that's contrary to Bruen, which says the Second Amendment creates a presumptive right to keep and bear arms.

THE COURT: So, obviously, Measure 114 has an
appellate process. So if someone doesn't -- isn't a law-abiding citizen, isn't issued a permit within the timeframe allotted under the statute, they can appeal it. They can appeal it directly to the circuit court and then the Court of Appeals.

Is there for the -- again, a TRO is an extraordinary remedy. With respect to the permitting portion, how can your clients show irreparable harm as a result of this permitting regime?

MR. KAEMPF: Your Honor, it's because of Bruen. It's because it takes Bruen and turns it upside down and says, "Well, we don't have a presumptive right. We've got to go through all of this," which, by the way, takes a long time, and my clients have given me an earful about the queue that's going with these background checks; then you've got the fingerprinting and all of this. That's irreparable injury because it delays a profound constitutional right to have a gun. That's one irreparable injury.

THE COURT: But your clients haven't applied yet; so how --

MR. KAEMPF: Well, that's what we're here to do today, Your Honor, is a preliminary injunction. As you well know, we're saying, "Please don't make us go through that." Because last year, in the Diocese of Brooklyn case, the Supreme Court said a key reason for injunctive relief is to prevent the risk of irreparable injury, and that's part of what we're asking for today.

THE COURT: Okay. I want to move off the permitting piece. I have briefing on it; and, obviously, you can argue whatever you'd like in your argument.

Now, the Bruen decision, despite all of its complexity, which it is very complicated, does not hold that all gun regulations are unconstitutional. And, indeed, the Bruen court stated that the Second Amendment is not a regulatory straitjacket and that it's not unlimited in its scope; and properly interpreted, the Second Amendment allows a variety of gun regulations. So I -- and I think all of -- MCDonald, Heller and Bruen all make clear that the individual defense --self-defense is the central component of the Second Amendment.

So with that in mind, I wanted to ask you, Mr. Kaempf, can the Government properly regulate certain firearms? So machine guns. What's your client's position on whether machine guns, which have been regulated, can still be regulated under Bruen? MR. KAEMPF: Your Honor, we're not here to say there can never be a regulation on guns. We're just focused on 114. THE COURT: So what can be regulated?

MR. KAEMPF: What can be regulated? Things like having a background check. Sure. Saying people have to show proof of some kind of firearms safety. Because things like that are consistent with the historic --

THE COURT: I'm talking about types of weapons. Are there -- or types bullets. So let me ask you this: Could the Government regulate body armor-piercing bullets or poisonous bullets?

MR. KAEMPF: Well, it would depend on who wants to
use it, you know. I'm not here to say they could never do that.

THE COURT: I'm putting law enforcement and military aside because here there's an exception in 114 for law enforcement and military use. High-capacity magazines are still allowed to be used by those groups. But I'm asking for the individual right of self-defense under the Second Amendment. Should the Government be able to regulate body armor-piercing bullets?

MR. KAEMPF: No. Because the presumption under Bruen is that a person has the right to have that kind of protection. And it would be up to the Government to say, "Well, you know, this has always been regulated. It's part of our historic tradition; so we can do that," and I wouldn't see that burden being met.

THE COURT: So is there some analysis that goes into this "What is necessary for self defense?" Is that something that I should be looking at? Is body armor-piercing bullets, for example -- which is not the issue in this case -- do I look at whether is having 11 rounds versus 10 rounds -- is it necessary for effective self-defense of an individual outside the home?

MR. KAEMPF: Yes. And you will see, in part, through my client Kevin Starrett, the president of OFF -- as we're calling it today for shorthand -- he states in his declaration
that having magazines in excess of 10 rounds is common. It has been for decades. And so it -- it is absolutely the opposite of the historic tradition that Bruen requires you to apply to say, "Well, now we're going to -- we're going to limit them." Your Honor, they're everywhere. And also you'll note, including the Glock --

THE COURT: What's everywhere?
MR. KAEMPF: Magazines in excess of 10 rounds. They come stock with -- for example, the Glock. That's the most popular handgun. You buy it; it comes stock with rounds in excess of 10 .

THE COURT: But whether a firearm is common, that's not the end of the inquiry, is it?

MR. KAEMPF: I'm not saying it's the end of the inquiry, but what I am saying is --

THE COURT: What is the end? What else do I need to determine? Don't I need to determine that it's commonly used for self-defense, individual self-defense?

MR. KAEMPF: Yes. And they are in common use, and they have been for decades in excess of 10 rounds.

THE COURT: For self-defense?
MR. KAEMPF: Yes. As a matter of fact, as Bruen says, self-defense is the central component of the Second Amendment. It's not to go out and do a mass shooting. It's, "Look at me. I'm in the dark. I'm walking home from work, and
now someone is coming after me. I have the right to defend myself, including with excess of 10 rounds," which

Mr. Starrett's declaration shows, have been in common use for decades.

If I could, Your Honor, as to Bruen -- I'll get to the test in a moment.

THE COURT: I'm not ready for your argument yet. I still --

MR. KAEMPF: Oh, I'm sorry. You go ahead,
Your Honor.
THE COURT: Yes. Thank you.
Now, do you agree or disagree that weapons that use high-capacity magazines are more dangerous than ones that use lower capacity?

MR. KAEMPF: Well, it depends on how you define "high capacity," Your Honor. One of the issues that we take with 114 and defense counsel is having in excess of 10 rounds is not high capacity.

THE COURT: Okay. So within the meaning of 114, which does call those high-capacity magazines --

MR. KAEMPF: That's one of the reasons why we're challenging it. Because in the day-to-day use and our nation's historic tradition, that's not high capacity. They are creating this image of somebody out there with an AK-47 that -THE COURT: Let me just have you answer my question,
though, which is having -- is it more dangerous or not to have a magazine with up to 10 bullets versus 11 or more?

MR. KAEMPF: People are more able to defend themselves -- the central component of the Second Amendment -if they have magazine rounds in excess of 10 rounds. That's because, as we said in the briefing, if you get attacked randomly, like in the dark, as I said -- these kinds of things that happen all the time -- you don't have time to change rounds and all of that. You need to have in excess of 10 rounds.

And as we point out in the briefing, the criminal is going to have in excess of 10 rounds, and that's what you're going to be dealing with, or, by the way, multiple criminals. It makes it more safe, and it helps -- addresses the central component of the Second Amendment if people can have magazines in excess of 10 rounds for self-defense.

THE COURT: All right. Let me ask you one additional question, which is -- I know three of your plaintiffs are sheriffs. Now, they're -- what is the harm that they face from Ballot Measure 114, since they are allowed to continue to have high capacity, as we -- as defined in the statute, under Measure 114, in the course of their duties? So tell me about that. What's the irreparable harm?

MR. KAEMPF: Yes, Your Honor, if I could. In fact, I spoke with Sheriff Bowen this morning and confirmed that.

First of all, in his county, Union County --
THE COURT: And if you can focus now just on the record and the case, not a conversation that you've had.

MR. KAEMPF: Okay. Well, the record that we have is we have the declaration from Sheriff Lohrey about the fact that it's going to cause a financial hit because of all of these regulations and he -- you know, in terms of the limits of his staff and the -- the weapons that they can have and their ability to protect people if they have to comply with all of this in limiting the rounds.

And also to have to go --
THE COURT: Hold on a second. So that is not a Second Amendment protection -- the financial impact. The Second Amendment protects right to -- for the individual to bear arms in self-defense. So what is the irreparable harm? The financial harm is not part of the Second Amendment.

MR. KAEMPF: Well, it infringes on the second Amendment rights of law enforcement to adequately protect the citizens of the counties that are at -- that are at issue in this case.

THE COURT: So does -- do law enforcement officers have a Second Amendment right to protect others? Is that part of the Second Amendment?

MR. KAEMPF: Yes, it is. They do. And it's part of the reason why they have weapons to protect all of us, and it's
recognized as part of our nation's historic tradition that we have law enforcement with weapons to also help people when they're under attack.

THE COURT: But you would agree that law enforcement conceivably should have weapons that are different than private citizens should have, wouldn't you?

MR. KAEMPF: No.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. KAEMPF: I don't see a historic tradition of that.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Buchal, let me ask you. On -with regard to, you know, the Fitz case -- I know you represent some gun sellers.

Or, I guess, Mr. Bergstrom. Sorry. You represent some gun sellers. Is there a Second Amendment right with regard to selling guns? Is that a right? Selling? Is that protected by the Second Amendment?

MR. BERGSTROM: Well, Your Honor, in Teixeira -- I don't know if I'm pronouncing that correctly, but in Teixeira the Ninth Circuit held that gun sellers and ammunition sellers have the right to bring lawsuits on behalf of their customers, which the customers would have a right to possess and keep these firearms. And sellers have standing under the Ninth Circuit and under a couple of Supreme Court cases to represent the rights of their purchasers.

THE COURT: But in terms of irreparable harm, is there a Second Amendment right that the sellers -- that infringes upon sellers if Measure 114 goes into effect? MR. BERGSTROM: Well, so the right that would be irreparably harmed is the right of purchaser. So we have one plaintiff, Mr. Fitz, who is a purchaser, and there were -- our plaintiffs Grayguns and G4 Archery also have other purchasers who, starting on December 8th, won't be able to purchase these firearms.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
Let me switch now to ask the defense a couple of questions.

And then, Mr. Kaempf, I'll get back to you, and you'll be able to make your argument and --

MR. BERGSTROM: Your Honor, can I --
THE COURT: Mr. Bergstrom?
MR. BERGSTROM: I'm sorry to speak out of turn, but I was wondering if I could address some of the questions you had asked the other plaintiffs?

THE COURT: Absolutely.
MR. BERGSTROM: Yeah, so the question you had asked --

THE COURT: Why don't I do this: Why don't I have you just answer that in the course of your argument.

MR. BERGSTROM: Okay. Can do.

THE COURT: Let me ask the defense now. I know in both the preamble to Ballot Measure 114 and also in your briefing there's a lot of talk about homicides and mass shootings and statistics related to those.

Does the legal landscape post-Bruen require me to essentially ignore the public interest, that you have been setting forth in your briefing, in analyzing whether a restriction or regulation is constitutional under the Second Amendment?

MR. MARSHALL: Not wholly, Your Honor. I think it is -- in a context, it's going to be different than it was under the intermediate scrutiny test that was pre-Bruen, but I think it's still relevant on this motion in two respects:

The first respect is that it's relevant to the public interest prong of the preliminary injunction hearing. And so insofar as the plaintiffs are seeking to get a temporary restraining order on the basis of, sort of, serious questions, or something like that, about how the balance of the equities tips, I think that still remains part of the Court's role in equity, that remains a component of the preliminary injunction test, and so I think it's relevant for that reason.

Now, even on the merits, when we come -- when we get to trial, I think it's still going to be relevant to the Court's inquiry because there is a style of balancing test that requires us to look at it in the light of history. Does this
have the same burdens on people and the same benefits to the Government as our historical antecedents that we identify do? And so to the extent that large-capacity magazines create a risk of a single individual killing large numbers of people, that is relevant to the -- to Bruen, both because it's an unprecedented social problem occasioned by a change of technology that did not exist in the 18th century, and Bruen acknowledges it in that respect; and, secondly, as the Court gives -- gives its historically grounded understanding of how the benefits and burdens are weighed, I think it still remains relevant that the Court will have to hear whether these large-capacity magazine restrictions are effective. And evidence on this record is that they are very effective, that they are the most effective based on the best empirical research that we are aware of and the best empirical research -- the only empirical research that's been provided to the Court on this motion.

THE COURT: Let me ask you. Along the lines of sort of how Bruen should be analyzed or regulations should be analyzed under Bruen, is it -- I'm aware of the case in the Southern District of California that is having a full-blown hearing regarding -- with experts, and I'm not sure of the details, but certainly that seems to be where Bruen suggests we go, in terms of looking at what was the historical context looking back even to the 16th century, England, and what was --
what existed at the time of the Founders and then all the -what restrictions were available, what weapons were available. What do you envision, from the defense's perspective, I'm going to need, in terms of -- to really analyze whether or not the Government or the defense has met its burden now that Bruen has placed upon the defense?

MR. MARSHALL: You are going to need history, and we provided history to you, actually, from those in California who have provided declarations, given the briefing schedule. We're in the process of retaining those same experts. We think that that's going to be required under footnote 6 of Bruen, that we are going to need to present historical evidence of those antecedents.

We present some of that, what we could achieve in presenting that to the Court in a week, and have presented that to the Court with historians. I mean, we have Ph.D.-level historians from each century -- 18th, 19th, and 20th -- that talk about historical antecedents. We provide that. There's no history provided by the plaintiffs.

And perhaps this is outside of my question; so please cut me off, and I'll do it in my argument, but I just want to make a delineation between the burden of proof at trial, which we completely accept that if on the threshold question that they establish that a large-capacity magazine is, in fact, an arm within the Second Amendment, that our burden to establish that
it is within the historic traditions of weapons regulation consistent with that right. That will be our burden at trial.

On the preliminary injunction stage, it remains their burden to establish a likelihood of success.

We cite, I think, a very persuasive authority from the Federal Circuit that talks about how to handle preliminary injunctions when the non-movant has the burden of proof at trial. And the Federal Circuit encounters this all the time in patent practice, where a patent-holder has the presumption and it's going to be -- if you're going to rely on invalidity at a preliminary injunction stage, that that's going to be the defendants' burden. And the Federal Circuit, I think, very persuasively holds that it remains the movant's burden on the motion to establish that. And I don't know how they intend to meet that burden, given that they presented no history to the Court.

THE COURT: Although, let me ask you about that, and that was actually my next question. Sort of how you square the burden from -- that are required for plaintiff to get a TRO versus the Bruen burden that has now been placed on the defense in analyzing firearms regulations.

Is it fair to say, however, in reviewing the element of a TRO likelihood of success on the merits, that I still have to make some analysis based on any evidence presented in the record, which I note the defendants have presented significant
records from the other cases that show historical treatment of firearms and restrictions? Don't I have to make some analysis of whether or not the Government has made a showing with regard to the merits and then determine whether the plaintiff can show likelihood of success on the merits based on the showing made by the Government? Am I analyzing that properly?

MR. MARSHALL: Yes, I think you are analyzing it correctly.

That's actually what the Federal Circuit does in these patent infringement cases. So there's a presumption of the validity of the patent, and the plaintiff comes to the Court. That's the same situation they're in. We're now bracketing the question of whether it's an arm. We obviously disagree about that. But assuming it is an arm, then the burden shifts to us because they have a presumption under Bruen that there is invalidity that -- that it's our burden.

And so we have a burden of production, but that's a pretty minimal burden. We need to provide some evidence to the Court. We provided quite a bit of evidence. Unfortunately, too much, I think, than can really be, you know, sunk into; but the -- but there -- but once we've met that burden of production, then it kind of tips back to the other side to say, "What is the Court's prediction?" not "Have we established definitively the merits of the case today?"; but, rather, "Can the Court predict that it is likely that they will succeed or
likely that we will not meet our burden?"
And, I think, based on the record that we have provided -that both sides have provided to the Court, we have shown that it is likely that we -- it's unlikely that they will succeed or it's likely that we will succeed in establishing that it's within the historic tradition.

I just wanted to make this sort of small point that, if it really was in equipoise, that, like, sides presented equally persuasive cases on that point, I think that the Federal Circuit's conclusion that that -- that the movant loses that case is quite persuasive.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
Let me ask you one more question. You cite several appellate court cases that have held -- including the Ninth Circuit -- that have held that restrictions on large-capacity magazines are consistent with the Second Amendment. Does Bruen change that analysis?

MR. MARSHALL: So it absolutely changes it. All of those cases that we cite are two-step cases; right? And step two, the intermediate scrutiny case, goes away. Those cases are still very relevant, I think, for kind of three reasons:

The first reason is that they contain a number of factual conclusions that are not going to change about the nature of large-capacity magazines. What they do, how many of them there are in the world, what their dangers are, and what their
benefits or lack of benefits for self-defense are, all of those are -- I think are fair game for the Court to rely on. And when you're choosing between whether to, you know, agree with whatever materials are cited by each side or declarations here, there's a lot of persuasive value to what a court of appeals on a much more full record was presented with and then concluded -- several courts of appeals -- not just one -- but many courts of appeals have kind of come to similar conclusions that these are not useful for self-defense. They're extremely dangerous. Those kinds of factual determinations, I think, remain persuasive on those factual points as you determine likelihood of success. So I think that's one way in which they remain relevant.

The second is that the threshold test, what was step one in the other -- in the prior regime, the pre-Bruen regime, is effectively the same as in the post-Bruen. That's the same question. Does the Second Amendment apply at all? The Fourth Circuit concluded that it didn't apply at all. And in Duncan v. Bonta, on that first question, the Ninth Circuit got very, very close on that en banc court to saying, you know, "It's not covered at all, but we know it's so clear under intermediate scrutiny, we're not going to bother with it."

But here, you know, it becomes more relevant. And so if the Court had to make a prediction on that threshold question, the best predictor of what the higher court is going to do is
that seven-to-four en banc decision where seven judges of the Ninth Circuit, sitting on that en banc court, which will still stay intact as the California case progresses, that they have concluded -- that they were very, very close to concluding that -- I can't remember the precise phrasing. Something like, you know, "serious merit," or something of that nature, that it isn't an arm at all because it's not more useful for self-defense than for military purposes.

So I think they remain important for that threshold question. And many courts have really gone in that same way, where they assume, without deciding, that they are an arm, conclude it's not intermediate scrutiny, but there's very little authority that the Government was -- that the Government is wrong on that in all -- any of those seven cases, and there's definitely authority that goes the other way.

The third thing that I think is just relevant for the Court is it's in the position of having to decide this question on an incomplete record and a temporary retraining order. It's that this litigation, this type of litigation, has been going on for a very long time. I mean, going back -- the first of those seven cases we cite was back in 2011, and plaintiffs haven't been winning any of them.

Now, granted, the standard has changed, and the standard changed in -- in Heller, and it changed again in Bruen; but even so, plaintiffs are not winning these cases on
large-capacity magazines. And I think that just has some relevance to -- as the Court just thinks about the situation that we're in -- that there are 12 states that have large-capacity magazines that -- and have considerable restrictions on them. Oregon has made the decision -- the people of Oregon have made a decision that we're going to become the 13th. I don't think that there's a really good reason that we should be the only ones to be enjoined.

THE COURT: And let me ask you in the -- in terms of factors to consider for balance of the equities in the case, is -- am I balancing, in the defendants' view, the Second -assuming, for the sake of argument, a Second Amendment infringement versus, obviously, the electorate passed Ballot Measure 114, so some interest in having people get what they voted for, but what are really the considerations you think I need for the TRO analysis on the balance of equities?

MR. MARSHALL: So I think the consideration is whether they have shown a risk of constitutional injury or -and, actually, I -- I misspoke. It's not a risk of constitutional injury. That they have to show a likelihood of constitutional injury. And we cite other district judges who have been in very similar situations that say that the serious -- serious questions test, if the -- if the point that you are raising in order to establish that you have an irreparable injury is a constitutional injury, you actually
have to show a violation of the -- of the Constitution. I mean, not show in the sense of prove at trial, but show in the sense of likelihood of success.

So, I think, if the first question is do they show that likelihood of success such that they have established any irreparable injury on this record and then if you balance that on our side of irreparable interest, the first is the sovereign interest of the State, and here the State as -- as instructed by the people to enact their laws, and the second is the public safety interest. And there is an implication for the pendency of the litigation or the pendency until a preliminary injunction can be held -- preliminary injunction hearing can be held in which the Court takes evidence as to whether or not the people or -- and the State are required to take the risk that they voted to lessen just a few -- a few weeks ago, and our position is that they should not be forced to bear that risk on this record without showing an actual likelihood of success on the Second Amendment claim.

THE COURT: Let me ask you one more follow-up question to that. Although you make the argument that magazines are not firearms within the meaning of the Second Amendment, with respect to the harm, you said that the plaintiffs haven't shown any actual harm is imminent from passage or effective -- or if Ballot Measure 114 goes into effect. What about the individual who now owns a high-capacity
magazine or a magazine under the high-capacity definition of Ballot Measure 114? They can have it at home. They can use it at home. They can use it for recreation. They can use it for hunting. They can use it if they're law enforcement. But they can't simply, if I understand the measure correctly, be out carrying it for self-defense. They would have to have a 10 or fewer rounds of ammunition magazine instead. Am I right on what's allowed?

MR. MARSHALL: Yes. We agree.
THE COURT: So if it's a Second Amendment --
assuming, for the sake of argument, I were to find it is a Second Amendment violation, then they could not do that as of Friday.

MR. MARSHALL: That's right.
THE COURT: So is that enough to show an imminent harm or not?

MR. MARSHALL: I've lost the hypothetical. I apologize.

Am I assuming that they have won the Second Amendment debate, or am I assuming that they -- that we don't have an answer to that? I just need to make sure that I understand what you're asking me to opine on.

THE COURT: So assuming the magazines do fall under the Second Amendment and there is likelihood of success on the merits --

MR. MARSHALL: Okay.
THE COURT: -- then can they show irreparable injury under the --

MR. MARSHALL: Sure. That would be a constitutional injury. The Court would have to weigh that against the interest -- the sovereign interest of the state and the public safety interest. I mean, they show authorities that I think are a little bit out of the norm. It's not really answering the question that the Court is faced with here where the public safety interests are so extraordinary but the -- but they are -- but, you know, that would be an irreparable harm if they establish a constitutional violation. I think our argument is essentially that they haven't.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
So now I do want to get to time for you all to argue anything you would like in support of your positions, and I will go -- start with Mr. Kaempf.

And, Mr. Bergstrom, if you need a little bit of additional time -- I know I didn't have you answer the questions, but I know you're paying close attention; so if you do need a little -- I'll tell you when it's 20 minutes, but if you need additional time, I'm happy to afford that to you just to answer those questions.

MR. BERGSTROM: Thank you.
THE COURT: Mr. Kaempf, you're on.

MR. KAEMPF: Thank you, Your Honor. Can I clarify? Did you say, "20 minutes"?

THE COURT: I said, "20 minutes."
MR. KAEMPF: Okay. So I have the floor, then. Is that okay, Judge?

THE COURT: You do. Sometimes I ask questions, though; so --

MR. KAEMPF: I -- I know, but I wanted to start with a couple of astounding things that defense counsel just said. He just said that you look at the cases that were already decided; and they are, quote, "The best predictor," end quote. They are the best predictor of how you should rule, you know, how courts above you would rule. And what do you know? We cited nine. Not one or two. Nine. Think about it. Bruen only came out in June. Nine district court cases. Your peers across the country. And in all of them -- the defense cites zero. In all nine cases, citing Bruen and its new test, district judges, like you, struck down those gun laws as unconstitutional, and they include these attempted bans by various states. Every one of them struck down by your peers. One, an assault weapons ban; two, a ban on large-capacity magazines; three, having a concealed carry permit; four, having to show good moral character; five, having to list all your social media accounts; six, barring all firearms on private property, absent the property owners' permission; seven,
barring "untraceable," quote/unquote, "firearms"; eight, no concealed carry at any place of worship or religious observation; nine, no obliterated serial numbers; ten, you cannot possess a gun if you're, quote/unquote, "under indictment." No. You would have to be an actual felon. Ten, you cannot carry a handgun outside for self-defense.

So I accept defense counsel's assertion that you should look to the cases as the best predictor, and that's nine best predictors that under Bruen it's a new day, and this law is unconstitutional.

If I may, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Mr. Kaempf, let me just ask you. I know you cited certainly some of those in your briefing. Did you cite all of those in your briefing? I just --

MR. KAEMPF: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. Perfect.
MR. KAEMPF: I cited nine -- to be clear, I cited nine cases. It's all nine that I could find, applying Bruen in just the last few months, and then having somebody bring a challenge into court, like yours, and in all nine that I found, boom, unconstitutional under Bruen.

So that's the best predictor, and that's their own test, and we're happy to apply it.

May I, Your Honor? I also found, if I could, briefly, to set the table for the Bruen test, that there are ten brief
guiding principles from Bruen. One, the Second Amendment elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding citizens to have arms for self-defense.

Two, this demands unqualified deference.
Three, the constitutional right for public self-defense is not a second-class right, Your Honor.

Four, individual self-defense is the central component of the Second Amendment right. Self-defense.

Five -- this is important; and, obviously, out of respect for you, Judge -- but I have to say this -- five, the very enumeration of the right takes it out of the hands of the Government .

And, six, it -- Bruen says, quote, the constitutional guarantees are -- if they are subject to future judges' assessments of their usefulness, that is no constitutional guarantee at all.

Obviously, I have great respect for Your Honor, but what Bruen is telling you is -- is it's not up to you. We already have the balancing. It happened in 1791 when we passed the Second Amendment. The balancing is over, and it -- it is an unqualified command, and it has -- it's not something -- and it says it is not subject to the evolving product of federal judges. It is not.

Seventh, the Second Amendment guarantees the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.

Okay? That's why the central component is self-defense.
Eight, the Second Amendment protects the possession and use of weapons that were in common use at the time. We all know we're going to talk about common use and historic tradition.

Nine, Bruen said the Second Amendment's, quote, "reference to arms" does not apply only to those arms in existence in the 18th century.

And, tenth, and, finally, in terms of Bruen's guiding principles before the test, the court said that the second Amendment extends to all instruments that constitute bearable arms. Even those not in existence at the time of the finding.

And in the Heller case, Your Honor, the Court specifically held that large-capacity magazines are firearms.

So you've got Heller, and you've got Bruen, and the presumption is that we have the right to engage in self-defense in commonly used magazines in excess of 10 rounds as established by Sheriff Lohrey's declaration and Mr. Starrett's declaration.

So with those 10 guiding principles, that -- the new test is real simple. Quote, "When the Second Amendment's plain text covers an individual's conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects" -- presumptively protects. The Government -- it is defense counsel -- the Government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the
nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation.
And this is important. The word "only." Only then may the Court conclude that the individual's conduct falls outside the Second Amendment's unqualified command.

So, Your Honor, this is different than any preliminary injunction motion $I$ have had in my 30 years of doing this here in Oregon because -- yes, I brought the motion. I represent the plaintiffs. But, really, under Bruen, they've got to show you contrary to the Second Amendment's presumption and its plain text. They've got to say, you know, actually, this is part of the historical tradition, banning magazines over 10 rounds and all this stuff, the permits to purchase, and all these requirements, and everything that's in 114 . Oh, yeah, it is not.

And we submit they cannot subvert the burden, and what we object to is that 114 says -- turns Bruen upside down. It says, "Well, an affirmative defense is if people applying for a gun can show this or that and the moral character and these various things." No. The burden is on them. It's basically they have to have an affirmative defense and say, "Look, Bruen says the Second Amendment applies." The central component is self-defense, and they've got to prove to you their affirmative defense of showing why it doesn't. Why these regulations are allowed. Why they're part of the historic tradition, and they're not because they've been in common use for a very long
time.
And as to text, which Bruen says controls, it allows plaintiffs to buy as many magazine rounds as they want. There's no restriction on magazine rounds in the Second Amendment, and there never has been in our historic tradition.

The Second Amendment doesn't say there's a limit. It says -- no, no, no, the right -- the people have -- "shall." "The right to bear arms shall" -- mandatory -- "shall not be infringed."

It doesn't say, "Oh, but if you get a permit, then you have that right." Background check and all this. No. It says the right of the people to bear arms shall not be infringed, and Bruen makes that very clear.

It is the Government that has the burden to demonstrate that 114 is part of our nation's historical tradition, and they do not.

So you have to look at history. And because, remember, as Bruen makes clear, the Second Amendment is a preexisting right that we got from England. It's not some new novel thing, and let's all have means-end scrutiny and talk about what's good. No, no, no. It codified a preexisting right, and the court says, "Elevated above all others." And it's the defense's burden to say, "No. Actually, you don't get that right. We are going to put all these regulations on it." They can't meet that because it's absolutely not part of our historic
tradition.
If I could, Your Honor, now that I have stated the ten key principles of Bruen and, obviously, its straightforward test to the four elements of a preliminary injunction.

May I, Your Honor?
Okay.
THE COURT: It's your argument.
MR. KAEMPF: Okay. I --
THE COURT: Fifteen.
MR. KAEMPF: I didn't know if you had a question, but thank you.

Anyway, the -- before you get into the four elements, as the Court knows, a preliminary injunction in a TRO balance the elements. So if you're stronger on one versus another, that can make up for it, and you still deserve a TRO or a preliminary injunction. And the other background fact that's important is that the purpose -- the purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo. That's all we want.

We're not saying, "Judge, do something new and impose all these new regulations on Oregon." We just want you to preserve the status quo. To keep it the way that it's been for decades.

And, by the way, that's not going to be unsafe for anybody because it's been that way for decades -- people having in excess of 10 rounds -- and we're not having any dangerous situations because those are commonly used for self-defense.

And we show a likelihood of success on the merits -- first element -- like the nine other district court cases I cite -- I cited to you since Bruen, and under Bruen's terms itself and under Heller, applying the test that it's an unqualified command that we shall have the right to keep and bear arms.

So we believe we will succeed on the merits just like the nine other cases that I cited to you, and defense counsel has a team of lawyers. They cite zero because there aren't any.

Two, a likelihood of irreparable harm. Under the Diocese of Brooklyn case from the Supreme Court in 2020, the court says that the purpose of an injunction is to prevent the risk of irreparable injury. We've got a risk. We ask you to prevent it, and it will be that if on December 8, a mere six days from now, we have to go through all of this, and they -- the -- see, the problem with 114 is -- and these, quote/unquote, "permit agents," okay -- "trust the Government" -- is that it's -- it now puts a presumption of guilt. You've got to go into the permit agent and show why you're good enough to have a gun. And, well, but if the permit agent has, quote/unquote, "reasonable grounds" -- "reasonable grounds," then you don't get the permit to purchase.

And Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurrence in Bruen, says, "No. It's got to be a clear objective standard." And 114 is just the opposite. And that's the irreparable harm that will happen if it comes in. Because now we can't go and get 10
rounds and buy them like we've been doing -- in excess of 10 rounds, like we've been doing for decades, transfer them where we want, have them where we want, and we ask you to prevent that, as well as having to give up the weapons, these various things that will take -- that will occur.

And this is important.
THE COURT: Are you saying background checks are unconstitutional?

MR. KAEMPF: No, I'm not saying background checks are unconstitutional. I'm saying that part of the irreparable injury is to look at all of 114 's terms as a whole, that are not consistent with our historic tradition.

And this is important, Judge: In the Elrod v. Burns case from the Supreme Court case in 1976, the Court said, quote, "The loss of constitutional freedoms for even minimal" -minimal -- "periods of time, constitutes irreparable injury."

That's what we're talking about. One second of 114 going into effect on December 8 and we have, as a matter of law, according to the Supreme Court, an irreparable injury.

Now, to the third element, which is whether an injunction is in the public interest, it is.

The Melendres case from the Ninth Circuit, Your Honor, says, quote, "It is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of constitutional rights." The word in there is "prevent."

That's why we're here today, Your Honor. Please, as the Ninth Circuit said in Melendres, prevent the violation of our Second Amendment rights, which 114 is, under the new Bruen test. That is why we meet the public interest. And by the way, we're doing that for all Oregonians, not just the plaintiffs in this case -- all the many members of the Oregon Firearms Federation, to uphold their constitutional right -- and it's in the public interest, please, to do that and prevent the irreparable injury.

And the other thing we would point out, in terms of the public interest, Your Honor, is keeping the long safe status quo of lots of people having magazines in excess of 10 rounds, which guns, like the Glock gun, the most popular handgun, they come stock with more than 10 rounds. Just keeping the status quo the way it is, is not going to endanger anyone. So that -the public interest, we believe, strongly favors the plaintiffs here, both on the facts and the controlling appellate law I just cited to.

And then the fourth and final prong, Your Honor, as you know, is the balance of the equities. And that tips in favor of the plaintiffs sharply because -- in part, because of the irreparable injury that's caused if you allow this to go in.

And what we want is to merely prevent unlawful regulations from going into effect.

If Oregon law stays the same way it's been for decades
concerning permits to purchase not applying like 114 has them, concerning people having -- being in excess of 10 rounds, that's not going to damage the public interest. There's not going to be some mass shooting just because the law stays the way it's been for a very long time.

And also, Your Honor, it will make -- to allow this to go into effect will allow -- will make Oregonians less safe because, you know, you hear the line that, "Well, then only the criminals will have the guns, if guns are illegal," and that's the point. If we established in the declarations of my client's -- Sheriff Lohrey, Adam Johnson, Kevin Starrett -that these magazines in excess of 10 rounds are commonly used for self-defense, including if law enforcement has to deal with people, and they -- they are in excess of 10 rounds and private people and the criminal who's -- a criminal is not going to go through background checks. They are not going to follow the rules, but then the law-abiding people are hamstrung, and then they get ambushed, perhaps in the dark. That will be very unsafe for people. If it's "Well, we, can't have a magazine in excess of 10 rounds," and that is not supported by our historic tradition, there are not analogues to that, that the Court would apply.

So for those reasons, Your Honor, applying the new Bruen test, I ask you to rule consistent with your nine peers in all nine cases decided since Bruen, which defense counsel says is,
quote/unquote, "the best predictor." Yes, please do the same, and we ask that you grant our motion for a preliminary injunction and a TRO today, Your Honor.

Thank you.
THE COURT: And, Mr. Kaempf, just on your last point, what evidence is there in the record that magazines of more than 10 rounds are commonly used in self-defense?

MR. KAEMPF: That is in Mr. Starrett's declaration.
THE COURT: But it's not based on any -- I mean, he says it, but is there any evidence that --

MR. KAEMPF: Well, he's the president of the Oregon Firearms Federation and has extensive experience with handguns and in his role as the lead plaintiff, and I haven't heard any challenge to whether his testimony is admissible.

And I also believe it's referenced in amicus briefs that this is something that is standard in the United States and has been for a very, very long time.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
MR. KAEMPF: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Bergstrom, this is your time.
MR. BERGSTROM: Thank you, Your Honor. I'm going to discuss -- I'll discuss our brief first, and then if there's time remaining or if there's questions that you asked earlier that I didn't get to, I'll address them then. But I would like to start off just by talking about the likelihood of success on
the merits in this case.
So as you mentioned, our plaintiffs only challenge the magazine ban. So the ban on magazines capable of holding more than 11 rounds.

And under Bruen, the test this Court needs to take to analyze these cases is straightforward. If the Second Amendment plain text covers the conduct regulated by the statute or, in this case, the ballot measure, the constitution presumptively protects that conduct. And to justify its regulations, the Government must demonstrate the regulation is consistent with our nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation.

So taking the text of the event at first, the text says, "A well-regulated" --

THE COURT REPORTER: Could you have him slow down, please?

THE COURT: Mr. Bergstrom, I'm going to ask you to slow down. Our court reporter is having difficulty picking you up; so --

MR. BERGSTROM: Sorry. Your Honor.
And sorry to the court reporter.
So the Second Amendment says that it's the right of the people to keep and bear arms. And I know that there's disagreement between the parties and the state as to whether or not magazines constitute arms. A couple things to say on that.

First, I think that that framing is really not the most helpful way of looking at it. I think the fundamental issue here is that the State of Oregon has made it illegal for people to purchase or to carry firearms equipped with magazines holding more than 11 rounds or 11 or more rounds, and that's a category of firearm that is extremely commonly used. And that category of firearm is certainly protected as an arm.

So whether you look at this as through the question, "Are magazines protected arms?" I would point to the Third Circuit's Association of New Jersey Rifle and Pistol Clubs' analysis of this and the Duncan v. Bonta's panel opinion's analysis of this showing that they properly are considered arms.

But even leaving that aside, whether they're arms or components of arms, the effect of the regulation is to make it illegal to carry or to buy a firearm that is capable of holding 17 rounds, as in the case of a Glock handgun; and that is, undoubtedly, a regulation on arms.

So then the question is, "Can it be justified by reference to our nation's historical tradition of firearm regulations?" And in this case, as we -- as Your Honor has discussed, asking questions already, there are -- there are cases under Bruen where we need to spend a lot of time digging into the historical records, seeing what other statues are out there; but in this case, the Supreme Court has done the historical framework.

It has already said, both in Heller and reiterated again in Bruen, that the sort of weapons that are protected -weapons protected were those in common use at the time. That comes from the Heller opinion at page 627. And that -- and the Supreme Court said that this limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carriage of dangerous and unusual firearms.

So there we have, I think, the answer to the question that Your Honor was asking earlier about what could be regulated.

What can be regulated here is dangerous and unusual arms. Dangerous and unusual -- and unusual ammunition, things like that.

What cannot be regulated is -- or what at least cannot be made illegal to purchase or to use are arms that are in common use at the time, and that time is today. We look at whether or not they're in common use today.

And I want to have a little caveat here to what Your Honor was asking about earlier. While self-defense is a component of the right, an important component of the right, it's not the be-all and end-all of the right.

So Heller says --
THE COURT: Hold on, Mr. Bergstrom. Doesn't the Supreme Court actually say it's the core right of the Second Amendment?

MR. BERGSTROM: The Supreme Court does use the word
"core," but elsewhere, Heller says that the protected arms are those that are typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes. So not just for self-defense but for all lawful purposes.

So it's not an element of the common use test that we have to show that these -- these arms are commonly used in self-defense, just that they are commonly used by people for lawful purposes.

And lawful purposes can include target shooting. It obviously includes self-defense, but it can also include target shooting, hunting, sport and recreation.

I mean, if you think about it another way, a bolt-action rifle, I believe, would be -- I have not looked at this, but I would believe would be used rarely for self-defense, but it's unquestionably an arm that's in common use for hunting and would be protected under the Supreme Court's tests from both Heller and from Bruen.

So then when you -- when Your Honor asked about whether or not machine guns or certain ammunition can be regulated, the question in every case is, is it commonly possessed by law abiding citizens? And if it's commonly possessed, then it cannot be banned.

This relates to the historical tradition against dangerous and unusual weapons being banned. In Caetano the Supreme Court, or Justice Alito, said very clearly that this is a
conjunctive test, meaning arms cannot be banned just because they're dangerous or just because they're unusual. They must be both dangerous and unusual.

In Caetano, therefore --
THE COURT: And, Mr. Bergstrom, is there a point at which the number of rounds in a magazine -- in a single magazine becomes dangerous?

MR. BERGSTROM: Your Honor, there may well be, and there may well also be a point at which the number of rounds in a single magazine becomes unusual, but in the D.C. Circuit's Heller II decision, the majority said that whatever that threshold is, it's well above 10. And if you look into our brief, we've submitted evidence that as -- as counsel for OFF said, the Glock handgun comes standard with a magazine and is the most popular handgun in the country. The most popular rifles in the country are frequently used with 30 -round magazines and overwhelmingly used with magazines with capacity in excess of 10 .

So when we're looking at this, the question the Court should be asking is, "Are these -- are these magazines commonly owned and commonly possessed and used for lawful purposes?" And they are. All the evidence shows that they are.

And that, we submit, effectively ends the inquiry.
A couple other questions that Your Honor asked earlier, that I would like to address, if I can -- you asked what the
value of the previous appellate cases are that address this issue. The Heller II and Kolbe and the Third Circuit's Association of New Jersey Rifle and Pistol Clubs, and I think I've got a point of some common ground here with the State when they say they are -- they have all been abrogated by Bruen. They are no longer good law, and their conclusions rested on step two of the analysis. And Bruen says clearly step two of the analysis is, in fact, not part of the analysis. But they do have some helpful analysis.

Now, where I'm going to differ from Oregon is what -- what parts of the analysis are helpful.

But the State mentioned that -- that several of these cases go on their way to address the commonality issue that I'm addressing here, and they find that these magazines are overwhelmingly commonly owned by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes. And, really, from our perspective, that ends this inquiry.

So we think that the Third Circuit decision, the D.C. Circuit decision, although they, under the oldest, went the wrong way for plaintiffs in this case, they provide the -- they provide the kernels of analysis that this Court needs to take in to go the correct way.

I would caution that we shouldn't count the win/loss record of plaintiffs before Bruen. Because Bruen specifically said that every circuit court to address this issue -- what the
analysis ought to be under Heller -- had gotten it precisely wrong. And so I don't think that those cases should be relied on for sort of counting who's the winner and the loser, but they do have helpful facts about commonality that I think predict what the record in this case will show.

As to what the record in this case ought to ultimately look like, either -- either at the PI hearing or at summary judgment, both Heller and Bruen were decided without the aid of expert testimony.

And in Bruen, the Supreme Court specifically responded to the dissent's suggestion that it ought to be -- that it ought to remand the case for development of a record of some sort, and it said that -- it said that in light of the text of the Second Amendment, along with the nation's historical history of firearm regulation, the conclusion that a state may not prevent law-abiding citizens from publicly carrying handguns because they have not demonstrated a special need for self-defense did not turn on factual questions. It was essentially an issue of pure law, and that's how we view this case.

Whether or not Oregon's Ballot Measure 114 violates plaintiff's Second Amendment rights is an issue of pure law. It involves analyzing the text of the amendment and taking judicial notice of facts about common use.

In Caetano, I would note that the facts that Justice Alito used to find that stun guns were in common use were facts that
he had taken judicial notice of. They were not facts that were submitted through expert testimony of some sort or through any other testimony.

THE COURT: But, Mr. Bergstrom, let me ask you about it. From just looking at Bruen, it certainly states in it that it urges courts to look at English history dating from the late 1600s and American colonial views leading up to the founding to determine whether a regulation in question comports with the American history and tradition of firearm regulation.

I'm not an expert. A litigant is not in a position to provide that information. So don't I have to delve into that historical analysis even by the terms of Bruen itself?

MR. BERGSTROM: Well, it's a legal history analysis, and it's history that was presented in Bruen through briefing.

I mean, I'm not saying that there shouldn't be, necessarily, amicus briefs to assist the Court, but it is -but in Bruen it was done without -- without expert witnesses, and I think it -- I think it can and should be done without expert witnesses in other Second Amendment cases. And I think that's especially true in this one, where, as I said, the Supreme Court has already done the relevant historical work here and has found that there is -- there is a tradition of banning certain types of firearms in this country or strictly regulating their use, but that tradition is limited to firearms that are dangerous and unusual. And as I said, that's
conjunctive; so if the Court finds, as I think it must, that these magazines are in common use and that firearms equipped with these magazines are in common use for lawful purpose -for lawful purposes by law-abiding citizens, then that's effectively the end of the inquiry under Bruen.

THE COURT: Is there evidence in the record that these high-capacity weapons, again within the meaning of 114, are used for hunting; and, if so, where is it in the record?

MR. BERGSTROM: So, again, there's no evidence that they are used for hunting in the record, that I'm aware of. There may be in the OFF case. I apologize if I'm misstating something. But we have not submitted anything saying that they're used for hunting, but they are used for lawful purposes.

THE COURT: Like what? What's the evidence in the record that they're used for lawful purposes?

MR. BERGSTROM: Well, I think it's -- I think it's, A, I believe the Court can take a look, as we suggested, at the Third Circuit decision in Association of New Jersey Rifle and Pistol Clubs' --

THE COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry. He needs to -THE COURT: Slow it down because it's hard to hear you.

MR. BERGSTROM: Oh, apologies.
The Duncan v. Bonta, both the panel opinion and

Judge Bumatay's dissent going to the facts on this issue. And we submitted in our brief facts that show that there are half a billion of these magazines in the country.

THE COURT: But that doesn't --
MR. BERGSTROM: Now, well --
THE COURT: But we also have competing facts that they're used for mass shootings. So where in the record does it tell me that they're commonly used for self-defense is the question? And then even with your argument that they are commonly used for other purposes, lawful purposes, like hunting, other recreation, shooting at the range, but what -what other purposes are in the record that I have that you have submitted?

MR. BERGSTROM: Well, again, Your Honor, I -- I'm going to construe the record here to include things in the cases cited in our briefs, if that's okay. Because the cases cited in our briefs establish, for example, that the Glock handgun -- that's the most popular handgun in the country -comes standard with this firearm.

Now, I mean, the vast majority of handguns are used lawfully for lawful purposes, for self-defense, things like that. The Court can take judicial notice of that and find that these are commonly used for lawful purposes.

Similarly, if there are half a billion of these magazines in the country, even if every -- even if every firearm --
firearm crime that took place annually -- or every crime that took place with a crime -- with a -- excuse me -- let me try one more time. If every crime committed with a firearm wasn't -- was committed with a firearm equipped with a large -with what the State of Oregon has dubbed a "large-capacity magazine" and each one used an individual one, it would still be a minute fraction of the overall number of these magazines in the country.

The vast majority of them are never used in crime. They are only used by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes. That's, I think, a matter of arithmetic.

THE COURT: Let me ask you -- and this is just sort of related but doesn't necessarily go to the analysis that you're talking about, but if one has access to magazines of 10 or less -- 10 or fewer rounds in one -- and, obviously, you can carry multiple magazines up to that amount under Ballot Measure 114 -- what can't someone do in terms of some of those common law-abiding purposes? Is there anything one can't do if you have the lower-capacity magazine?

MR. BERGSTROM: Well, Your Honor, respectfully, I'm going to take issue with the question. So in Heller -- Heller said specifically that this is not the way that we can think about firearms. The State can't take away some options and leave other equally good -- even if they're equally good options. We don't concede they're equally good options, but
let's say the State took away, at random, you know, 50 percent of the firearms and left the other 50 percent there and said, "Well, you can use the other half." Heller, at page 629, said, "It is no answer to say, as petitioners do, that it's permissible to ban the possession of handguns as long as possession of other firearms (i.e. long guns) is allowed. It's enough to note, as we have observed, that the American people have considered the handgun to be the quintessential self-defense weapon."

So in that case -- and Heller was more focused on self-defense than on other uses; but, again, the principle applies to all lawful uses. It's the choice of the American people that count, and the American people have overwhelmingly chosen firearms that are equipped with magazines in excess of 10 rounds.

And Oregon can't say -- can't be heard to argue that they should be just as happy with -- with firearms holding fewer rounds because that is -- that decision -- the Supreme Court has told us that the Second Amendment takes certain options off the table and --

THE COURT: Let me ask you two things. One, you quoted the Third Circuit case; but isn't it, in fact, true both the D.C. Circuit and the Third Circuit decide -- basically stated they were not deciding whether large-capacity magazines were, in fact, in common use. They decided the case
specifically saying, "We're not deciding that issue whether they're in common use." Isn't that correct?

MR. BERGSTROM: Well, just to be clear, the Heller opinion I just quoted to you, that's the Supreme Court's Heller.

THE COURT: Yeah, let me ask you about that. Heller -- my second question is isn't Heller a complete ban on firearms? That's not what we have here.

MR. BERGSTROM: Well, taking your questions in turn, both the -- the D.C. Circuit and the Third Circuit, both, ultimately, did not have to decide the first issue because they could resolve the case on the "Here's the scrutiny approach that the Supreme Court has now decisively rejected."

THE COURT: So they didn't decide. But you said I could use that as a record for determining that these are commonly used magazines; but that's not what I can take from the Third Circuit, is it?

MR. BERGSTROM: Well, they ultimately did not need to decide. They did decide that -- I believe the Heller decision and the Third Circuit decision both decided they were commonly used. Whether or not --

THE COURT: Heller?
MR. BERGSTROM: Sorry. The Heller II decision. The D.C. Circuit one. Both decided that they were commonly used, I believe.

And then as to --
Could you remind me what your second question was?
THE COURT: My second question was Heller involved a complete ban on firearms, didn't it?

MR. BERGSTROM: Yes, it did; but that's --
THE COURT: That's not what we have here; right?
MR. BERGSTROM: Well, it is a ban on purchase and
sale and transfer and on possession of new magazines of an
entire category of arms. It's a ban on firearms capable of firing more than 11 rounds without reloading. So in that case, it's the same as Heller.

Heller banned handguns, but it left people able to acquire rifles. And the Supreme Court said that was not an adequate tradeoff. You can't ban an entire category of arms unless it's dangerous and unusual, or I think they used the term "highly unusual in society at large" in Bruen.

And that's not the case with these firearms equipped with these magazines.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
MR. BERGSTROM: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Anything further?
MR. BERGSTROM: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Let me hear from the defense.
MR. MARSHALL: So I want to start where the last piece of argument left off, which is this question of whether
large-capacity magazines are arms at all.
And I think the Court of -- the language used by the Court of Appeals in these cases is a little bit confusing, and so I think that maybe the Court and Mr. Bergstrom were talking past each other. I'll try to resolve some of that.

Let's just start with Heller, and I think that the important passage in Heller on this point is, in part, the part -- the piece that Mr. Bergstrom quoted, which is that the handgun is the quintessential. The quintessential. That it's uniquely well-suited. What that argument was responding to was the argument that a long gun was sufficient to allow citizens of the District of Columbia to defend themselves, and the Heller opinion says, "No, it's not." And the reason it's not is because it is uniquely well-suited to have a handgun for self-defense. That's the reasoning of Heller. And that's because it is -- it is uniquely well-suited that it is the quintessential weapon for self-defense, that that is why it is, in fact, an arm, as opposed to those that the Government can continue to ban, which have other purposes that they are better suited for. For example, military purposes or criminal purposes.

And I think that is where we get into disagreement with Mr. Bergstrom's reading of some of these Court of Appeals cases that we both agree have some bearing on the question.

So as the Court said, that the -- on remand in Heller and
in that Third Circuit decision in New Jersey Association -Association of -- New Jersey Rifle Association, something like that -- the New Jersey Rifle Association case. In each of those cases they have said there are a lot of large-capacity magazines in the states and in the nation as a whole. But both of those courts said that fact alone is not sufficient.

Because what the Court needs to determine is whether they are, in fact, commonly used for self-defense purposes.

And so every piece of -- that I was able to track down of these courts of appeals cases where there's quotations in the briefing that say there are millions or hundreds of millions of large-capacity magazines in the United States, this is in -true in the Third Circuit case. This is true in the D.C. Circuit's case in the remand in Heller. They said, "But that's not enough."

The next paragraph says, "That's not enough for the Court to conclude that it is, in fact, an arm." Then they go to the intermediate -- the intermediate scrutiny test and -- and decide on that ground, which has been superseded.

That's exactly what Duncan v. Bonta said. The facts they're providing to the Court here are the same facts the Ninth Circuit had when it decided Duncan v. Bonta en banc.

I mean, Mr. Bergstrom committed to you the panel opinion. That panel opinion was reversed by the en banc court. So I think the en banc court's opinion is the one that you should
look at, which, as I said before, is extremely close to saying and, I think, provides basically the entire reasoning that the Court would need to conclude that on this record they have not established that these are, in fact, arms protected by the Second Amendment.

And then you go to the Fourth Circuit case, which, I think, is the only one that I'm -- that I -- I have not -- I can't say this with certainty, but I think that -- I do know that the Fourth Circuit case -- I do not -- I can't speak to all seven of those cases with certainty, but the Fourth Circuit case certainly did decide that it was not an arm, and it had these facts in front of it that these are -- there are lots of individuals who have large-capacity magazines; but, again, it rejected the notion that they were arms protected by the Second Amendment at all.

And so, in our view, the Court does have to turn to the question of whether they are, in fact, commonly used for self-defense. The best record -- the best evidence in the record is the Allen declaration at ECF 17-1. The Court can also look to the failure of proof on behalf of the plaintiffs on this point in all the Court of Appeals cases that we talked about. But that says that the -- that it is extraordinarily rare that defensive uses, as cataloged by the National Rifle Association, involved a firing of -- firing of more than 10 rounds. It's extremely rare. Like, less than 1 percent rare.

That the average number of shots fired in defensive use is 2.3-- 2.3 rounds. There's no contrary evidence that has any sort of systematic evaluation of how commonly used they are. And so on this record, the Court really has to defer to what has been presented to it.

Now, this goes to the question of whether we're talking in the world of pure law or facts. And I would just say that we think that the facts matter here, both on the history and on the actual burdens and benefits of large-capacity magazines; and I think footnote 6 of Bruen is really important because it says that the courts are supposed to rely on the ordinary litigation process, the party presentation principle, to determine the history.

And that is what we have tried to abide by here by presenting history to the Court and actual facts of what the historical tradition is.

I also differ with my friend about the question of whether, once you determine that it is commonly held, that that is the end of the case. It's just not. That's the first question, is to whether it is commonly held for self-defense purposes. It's the threshold question as to whether this is an arm and protected by the Second Amendment at all.

If they prevail on that, it becomes the State's burden to establish it's within the historical tradition of regulation of arms, and we provide several examples from the 18th century,

19th century, and 20th century of places where there are unusually dangerous weapons that are prohibited by the states and that they are constitutionally permitted to do so.

And so on this second question of what the historical record looks like, I just -- I don't see what -- what is being presented by the plaintiffs on that issue, and I think it's really important that it's not -- that we have to show the exact same -- the exact same regulation existed in the past. I mean, that -- these weapons didn't exist in the 18th century. They didn't exist in the 19th century in the same way, with the same level of lethality.

The question is whether an analogous regulation exists. And that Blackstonian category of "dangerous and unusual" is the category which it -- which this falls into if we get past the threshold question of whether this is an arm at all.

THE COURT: Let me ask you. How does one define "dangerous"? For example, is that something that can evolve over time?

So, again, you make a point in your briefing on how large-capacity or capacity magazines over 10 have been used in mass shootings. That -- and you make the point in your briefing that it's a relatively recent phenomenon. Can I consider or is it appropriate for a court to consider that outside circumstances might make something more dangerous than it would inherently be, or is that not the right analysis?

MR. MARSHALL: So the --
THE COURT: So in evaluating whether in -- using Bruen's analysis, is something unusual or dangerous, can something be seemingly innocuous, a magazine with a certain number of rounds previously, but now that society has seen the use of that particular instrument in a way that perhaps wasn't contemplated, does it become -- does the instrument itself or the magazine itself or the gun itself become unusual and dangerous, or not?

I mean, I'm just, again, sort of struggling with how much to take into account the events that both are in the preamble of 114 but also that are cited in your briefing. And your brief ends, I believe, with a shooting in a synagogue. So I'm just trying to understand exactly how to include those -- or decide whether I should include those scenarios in my analysis.

MR. MARSHALL: Okay. I'll answer that a few ways. So the first way is that Bruen says that if it is an unprecedented technological change or an unprecedented social problem either/or unprecedented psychological change.

So, you know, at some point in this case -- I don't know whether they made it into this -- into the briefing here -there are going to be weapons cited to you that are going to say, "Well, there was a 12-shot firearm. You know, a 12 magazine -- a 12 -round magazine on this firearm in the 18th or 19th century," et cetera. Whether it was dangerous then and
dangerous now are two different things because of the other technologies that were around. You know, they're around that.

So if you have 12 rounds but every round takes two seconds to fire, that's a lot different than 12 rounds today. So technological change matters.

Second: Unprecedented social problem. And I think you're referring to the Klarevas declaration where we provide a catalog of every shooting at which a single shooter has killed 10 or more people in American history. And you just see a spike from 1998 onward, and that -- sorry -- from 2009 onward and the number of those there.

I think that is in the category of "unprecedented social problem," that there is a risk that a single individual can commit that many killings by themself.

So I think that is relevant to the Court's analysis.
I think it would be helpful for the Court to also look at page 10 of the Klarevas declaration -- ECF 17-5 -- where we provide some pretty clear data of how recently large-capacity magazines came into the stream of commerce in the United States.

And so it said -- in 1955 one percent of firearms used large-capacity magazines. 1965 one percent. 1975 two percent. 1985 five percent. 1995, just prior to the federal prohibition and the assault weapons ban, seven percent.

So we're not talking about a long tradition where there
have been large-capacity magazines. What we're seeing is a reaction to this unprecedented social problem combined with technological change.

And, I guess, I -- I guess, I'll respectfully have to just push back a bit on the notion that it's something extrinsic to the technology that is causing this problem. I think that attachment 8 is an extremely persuasive empirical study that shows the relationship between large-capacity magazines and the capacity to keep the -- to have these -- to have mass shootings. I think there is also another set of empirical research, which is Klarevas, et al. So it's not the declaration that Klarevas wrote, but it's a peer-reviewed publication that he wrote. That's at ECF-5 at 32. It says, "Table 2," there. That talks -- that shows the relationship between prohibiting large-capacity magazines and the likelihood in any manner of things, whether you look at it as how many people when there's -- how many people die in an attempted mass shooting, how many mass shootings are there, all of those datapoints all turn on whether a state makes the choice that the people of Oregon just made, which is whether or not that state decides to permit large-capacity magazines to be used.

So I think all of that is -- is quite relevant. THE COURT: So taking, for example, that last statistic, in terms of -- if you can show the relationship -or if there's evidence -- or there is evidence in the record
that you have presented that shows a relationship between harm reduction in mass shootings and the capacity of magazines, where does that fit into the analysis?

MR. MARSHALL: So that fits into the analogical
reasoning component. So we first take a look at what historically our ancestors were doing when they decided how to regulate the weapons of their time, and so you look at where the burdens and the benefits of those regulations were. And so you know, the -- at a very high level, the regulations of -over the 18th and 19th and early 20th century is Americans continue to -- can continue to bear arms that are necessary for self-defense, that have -- they are uniquely well-suited for self-defense, but there's a category of weapons that are not uniquely well -- uniquely well-suited for self-defense, and the Government continues to have authority to prohibit them.

And so you -- and so that -- and so when you're looking at those benefits and burdens, you have to look at what the benefits and burdens -- and I think this is straight out of Bruen -- are to the modern -- to the modern -- the modern piece of this. I think it's a little bit unclear whether you're supposed to assume the State is right or whether the State has to prove it's right about those burdens, whether -- you know, what level of proof we have to provide on what the modern benefits and burdens are.

But I think at some level the Court is going to have to
dig into the question of -- of are large-capacity magazines, in fact, necessary to self-defense? How much would -- does this compromise capacity of self-defense at all, and I think the answer is, you know, very, very little or not at all; and then -- and then what are the benefits to the public of -- of taking one particular component of a weapon off the table, and I think we will be able to show at trial that there's a very large benefit to that and that the people, when they put this on the ballot, because they were outraged by what they were seeing in other states and had fear that that would come here, that they have -- that they are entitled to make that decision.

THE COURT: And if I -- am I correct that one could, even after Ballot Measure 114, have multiple magazines in their possession at one time?

MR. MARSHALL: Absolutely.
THE COURT: With rounds up to 10 rounds?
MR. MARSHALL: Absolutely. No limit whatsoever.
Last point, I -- to the extent that the Court would like more recent decisions from -- that are post-Bruen that come out the other way and uphold Government regulations, we would commend to the Court Range v. Attorney General out of the Third Circuit. I don't have a Westlaw number, but the case number is 21-2835, November 16, 2022.

We didn't focus very much on post-Bruen, large-capacity magazine cases, because there really aren't any. There are two
district court decisions out of colorado that my friends on the other side have cited to you. Both of those were presented to TROs where the Government didn't even respond. Both of those TROs are no longer in force.

I think the plaintiffs in those cases voluntarily dismissed, and there's some negotiation among the parties about how to move forward at the outset; but I think you will be the first judge to adjudicate a TRO on the question of
large-capacity magazines and whether the states retain, after Bruen, the ability to impose this.

THE COURT: Let me switch gears for a minute, just to the permitting. One of the issues raised in the briefing is that the State is still working on how the permitting is going to work, and it's not yet fully in place. Is there -- and now plaintiff argues -- which, again, it did not argue in its briefing, specifically, about the non-discretion -- excuse me -- the discretionary nature now, is what I'm understanding, of the permitting scheme.

Can you respond to that argument?
MR. MARSHALL: Which one? Or both?
THE COURT: I would --
MR. MARSHALL: The readiness?
THE COURT: Readiness.
MR. MARSHALL: The administrative implementation? THE COURT: Correct.

MR. MARSHALL: So on the administrative
implementation, there will be -- people will -- Oregonians will be able to apply for a permit on December 8th.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. MARSHALL: And so I want to be clear about this.
THE COURT: Actually, let me ask you this --
MR. MARSHALL: I -- we can talk about this as long as
you want. My preference, though, is that I would rather discuss it in the context where the administrative case -where the administrative issue is raised squarely, which is the "Eyre" case -- "Aire"? I -- I apologize. I'm learning a lot of case names to this, but the third filed case.

THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. MARSHALL: Where this question is, albeit
without -- well, I shouldn't argue on -- I don't -- I'll stay out of the substance, but just to say we will present an evidentiary record on readiness when that issue is squarely raised. We interpreted the first filed case to raise only a facial challenge. We responded on a facial basis. We disagree that -- we agree that it's a "shall" -- we believe it is a "shall issue" regime under Heller, and we do think that the State will be ready to implement the permit to purchase requirement on December $8 t h$.

THE COURT: Isn't there some argument, if the state is not ready to implement, that goes -- cuts against
irreparable harm, in any event?
MR. MARSHALL: I'm sorry. I lost that.
THE COURT: If the State is not ready to implement, that means people are not going to be having to seek permits? Or that's -- am I misunderstanding?

MR. MARSHALL: You know, I think we're starting to argue a case where my opponent on that case is not at the podium. So I -- I would rather say it the other way. I mean, I think the answer is I -- I think that's a hypothetical that won't occur because I think the State is intending to implement on December 8th and will be ready to do so. And if -depending on what the Court's schedule allows, we will present that evidence at the appropriate hearing.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
Mr. Kaempf, you've got five.
And, Mr. Bergstrom, you have five as well.
MR. KAEMPF: Thank you, Your Honor.
May I clear up a few things about the record? And I would point you at this point, Your Honor, to the declaration of Kevin Starrett, the president of the Oregon Firearms Federation. In particular, if you look at paragraph 2 of his declaration in the record, it says, quote, "Magazines over 10 rounds are commonly possessed by the American public and have been for generations. Such magazines have existed since before the American Revolution. They have been commonly possessed in
the United States since 1862."
Think about that. That's -- at the time that was President Lincoln. Okay.
"And their popularity has steadily increased ever since that time."

And then paragraph 4 of Mr . Starrett's declaration in the record says, "Magazines of up to 30" -- not just 10 now -"magazines up to 30 rounds for rifles and up to 20 rounds for handguns are standard equipment for many popular firearms. These magazines are overwhelmingly used for lawful" -lawful -- "purposes." And "Common sense tells us the small percentage of the population who are violent gun criminals is not remotely large enough to explain the massive market for magazines of more than 10 rounds that has existed since the mid 19th century."

So I just want to -- if anybody had this impression, "Oh, well, 114 was needed because these are more than 10 rounds. That's just crazy. We've got to stop it." No. It's been going on -- people have had more than 10 rounds since the 1860s. That's in the record through Mr. Starrett's declaration, and I think that that is important.

And he also says, in paragraph 7, "There's nothing unusual or novel about magazines that could hold more than 10 rounds."

And he also says in the same paragraph that the banned magazines in Ballot Measure 114 are commonly preferred by
law-abiding Oregonians, including the plaintiffs, for self-defense, and it's been that way since the 1860s. And I think that's very important.

Now, another issue on the record, Your Honor, is in the amicus briefings I'm looking at from the Silent Majority Foundation. They point out that we have -- and this is on page 8 of Amicus Silent Majority Foundation, on the numbers you were getting to, the statistics that I think are important.

THE COURT: Let me ask you about that. You did not submit that in support of your TRO. I -- that just was -- I allowed it to be part of the record yesterday. It just came in. What authority is there, really, to allow you to rely on that record today in support of your TRO?

MR. KAEMPF: Because they are amicus for me, on my side, and they were allowed to apply. They are not amicus for the defense. They are amicus for the plaintiff.

THE COURT: Well, "amicus" is "friend of the court." They're supposed to give me neutral information.

MR. KAEMPF: But I -- I -- sure. But the point is what they submit supports our position, including the statistics.

May I just briefly finish, Your Honor?
THE COURT: I'm not sure I'm going to consider it at this point.

MR. KAEMPF: Oh, no, no, and I would just say this:

When you look at Heller, when you look at McDonald, when you look at Bruen, amicus briefs are routinely considered by the court in making its decision. So I think that that is something routine that the court would do.

Yes, it's "friend of the court," and what those statistics show is how there are hundreds and millions of magazines that are in circulation in the United States in excess of 10 rounds; and, again, it's been that way since the 1860s.

And even without amicus, Mr. Starrett's declaration establishes that the prevalence of magazines in excess of 10 rounds, that they are used primarily by -- lawfully by people for self-defense and that it's been that way since the 1860s.

One other thing I want to point out, if I could, is they talk about these seven appellate cases; but, Your Honor, those really are in the dustbin in light of Bruen. I mean, it's just the whole two-step thing and the means-end and these things addressed by seven other appellate cases, those -- those don't matter any more than I don't think anybody would cite Roe $v$. Wade anymore in light of the Dobbs decision. Okay? Respectfully, to them.

I think that what matters are the nine cases that I cited to you that say, "Look, Bruen is a new day. Here we are. We're applying it." And all those constitutional challenges to you, including a ban of -- on large-capacity magazines and "You've got to show me your social media accounts" and this,
that, and the other thing that are similar to 114 -- nine cases. That's what matters, and he said that's what -- the cases are the best predictor. That's the best predictor.

So we respectfully ask Your Honor to join your nine peers by applying Bruen and its presumption that because we have "People shall have the right to bear arms" that this, 114, is unconstitutional and will cause irreparable injury no later than six days from now, and we have shown that it's in the public interest to keep the law as it is until then.

They haven't -- the State hasn't shown a harm if you keep things the way they've been for years, and we ask that you please issue a preliminary injunction and a TRO before December 8th so they're -- under the Supreme Court's decision in the Diocese of Brooklyn, that prevents -- prevents the irreparable harm. That's the point of why we're here today.

And as I said earlier, the purpose of a TRO is to preserve the status quo, and the status quo, since 1860 -- okay? -- has been that we have magazine rounds in excess of -- in excess of 10; and the status quo, since 1791, when we adopted the Second Amendment, does not require a permit to purchase and all of this. Okay? It does not. And Bruen says you look at the plain text. And if what we want to do is covered by it, then it's presumptively -- presumptively protected. And the state has not shown that there is -- there are historical analogues or historical tradition for 114.

114 would be the most extreme law in the nation if it's allowed to go into effect. That's why we filed the lawsuit; and, in particular, because of Bruen, we think, as the nine cases show, this Court should also grant the injunctive relief, Your Honor.

And thank you very much.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Kaempf.
Mr. Bergstrom, you have five.
MR. BERGSTROM: Thank you, Your Honor. I'll be brief, but I will speak slowly.

First, I would like to correct myself, if I can, on the Third Circuit and D.C. Circuit opinions that you referenced. Your Honor was correct. In both cases, the court did not ultimately decide the issue of commonality. Although in both cases the court said that millions of the -- the records showed millions of these magazines were owned, and the Third Circuit said they are typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for hunting, pest control, and occasional self-defense.

If I can also amend the answer on where -- where in the record can the Court find evidence that these hundreds of millions of magazines are used lawfully? On page 13 of our brief, we cite the National Firearms Survey that Professor English put together, and he polled owners on why they -- what purposes they owned these magazines for. 64 percent of them said target shooting. 62 percent of them
said home defense. 42 percent said hunting. 41 percent said defense outside the home.

So those are all lawful purposes protected by the second Amendment that these hundreds of millions of magazines are used for.

Counsel for the State mentioned the Duncan en banc opinion that vacated the Duncan -- the Duncan panel opinion. And I would just like to point out that I was not intending to rely on the Duncan panel opinion as anything close to binding precedent. I think it's persuasive for this Court, and we can kind of go back and forth on this because, of course, the Duncan en banc opinion was vacated by the Supreme Court following Bruen.

So none of them are good law, but the Court should look to the bits that are persuasive.

The Kolbe Fourth Circuit case that the State relies on, I would like to say that is an unpersuasive pre-Bruen decision, and the reason it's unpersuasive is Kolbe applied a test that was unique. These other cases went through the two-step analysis. Kolbe did -- Kolbe applied, like, an M-16 test, which the -- I believe it was the Duncan panel noted was effectively a jurisprudential dead end.

The Fourth Circuit not -- has decided to analyze this issue that way, and no other circuit has followed suit.

In Bruen, at the -- Bruen makes very clear that that was
not the way courts would be analyzing this. Bruen reiterates that it's common use and dangerous and unusual weapons that can be banned; but, otherwise, firearms are protected by the second Amendment .

Last of all, the State talked about its evidence on the historical tradition, and the Court asked where this -- where this evidence about mass shootings and horrible crimes comes into this analysis, and the State said it was through the analogy prong of the Bruen test. And I would like to just say, first of all, the way that the analogies have to work under Bruen is that regulations -- the State's right. We're not looking for a historical twin, but we are looking for laws that burden the rights in the same way and for the same reasons.

So, for example, the State, I know, references in its briefing, sort of, restrictions on private military groups. That does -- restricting the ability to form a private military group versus restricting the ability to purchase a firearm equipped with a 17-round magazine -- those do not burden the right in the same way. And so the -- those cannot be considered analogues under Bruen.

More broadly, footnote 7 of Bruen -- I would direct the Court to footnote 7, which cautions specifically against engaging in means-end scrutiny under the guise of the analogical inquiry. The court said the second Amendment is the product of an interest-balancing by the people, not the
evolving product of federal judge. An analogical reasoning requires judges to apply faithfully the balance that has been struck by the founding generation to modern circumstances.

So that means that to the extent that the Court -- the State's analogical argument depends upon finding that the interests the State is pursuing are really important or that the State really does mean well in its regulation. That's irrelevant. And the court in Bruen specifically cautioned against considering it.

So with that, I'll just conclude by saying that, because plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim, the other preliminary injunction factors follow suit, and this Court should enter a temporary restraining order in our favor.

Thank you.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Bergstrom.
Obviously, this is a very complicated area of law; so I am going to take your briefing under advisement and consider the arguments that you've made here and go back and check some of the cases that you have highlighted. So I'm not making a decision on this today.

I do want the parties to confer -- whatever decision I make, there's going to be a preliminary injunction hearing. Obviously, the timing could be affected by the decision I make, but whether -- I would still like the parties to confer and plan by December 6th, maybe, just to give me a proposed
briefing schedule.
MR. MARSHALL: Your Honor?
THE COURT: Is that too soon?
MR. MARSHALL: So I'll just ask for a couple of things. First, if we can have -- if we can time it off of when the Court releases its order because that will influence the parties' positions.

THE COURT: I'll do -- I expect -- I hope to have a decision out Monday; latest Tuesday.

MR. MARSHALL: Okay.
THE COURT: So before -- certainly before Measure 114 goes into effect.

So why don't I allow you, then, say, 24 hours from the time I issue my decision to come up with a proposed briefing schedule for a preliminary injunction hearing.

Does that make sense?
MR. MARSHALL: And just to make sure that we're clear, the preliminary injunction hearing that you are contemplating is a live testimony hearing, or what is it? Or you would like the parties to confer?

THE COURT: I want the parties to confer and let me know what -- how you would like to approach it. I've done both in cases that I have had; so it's up to you. If you can adequately present the -- it does seem to me that to have a fully developed record is going to require some historical
information from, potentially, experts; but I -- I'd leave that to you to formulate how best to represent your side.

But let me know if -- what $I$ don't want is last-minute people calling people to come into court. I want two weeks notice before a witness is coming in so the other side has -I'm trying to get the best data I can and from the best experts that are available. And if it means at some point $I$ have to select my own expert, that might be -- certainly, that's something courts look at doing. So I haven't decided. I would like you to confer and make a recommendation to me on how best to approach this very complicated area of law and which is a new landscape. So I want to understand it better from both sides so I can make a reasonable decision.

So, I think, on this case, we're done. I know on the -Oh, I want to talk about consolidation. Mr. -- and it did seem to me that there is merit to consolidating the cases; but why don't I first -- is there -- from the defendants' perspective, is there an objection to consolidation?

MR. MARSHALL: Oh, I apologize. I forgot I'm the defendant.

There is -- no. We are moving for consolidation. I said "in due course" in my email earlier today, but if you are inviting it, we move -- we so move.

THE COURT: Mostly, I wanted to hear objections to it.

MR. MARSHALL: No objection.
THE COURT: But I wanted to make sure that there was at least support for actually consolidating the cases.

Mr. Kaempf?
And I do see your hand, Mr. Buchal. I'll get to you.
Mr. Kaempf, does your client or clients -- do they take a position?

MR. KAEMPF: A couple of things. No, and I -- quite simply, Your Honor, I hope you will understand this has been a fire drill for about a week for me and my staff and my clients, and I saw the emails going back and forth about consolidation. I pride myself on not being cagey with judges, but on that one I can't take a position because $I$ simply haven't had time to think about it. But I promise that I will do that promptly.

And the other thing I wanted to say, Judge, is that in my years of doing this, I had never seen a judge at any level issue an order to hold an emergency hearing on a federal holiday like you did on Thanksgiving, and we -- whichever way you rule -- obviously, we hope it's for the plaintiffs -- but we just wanted to thank you for that and your staff because, you know, $I$ am sensing it -- it was a bit of a fire drill on your side of the courtroom as well. We thank you for doing that. We thank you for the emergency hearing. And I will confer with the defense, and we'll get to the Court on the issue of consolidation.

Thank you, Judge.
THE COURT: Okay. And I'm not opposed to waiting on the issue of consolidation. I think I will consolidate the hearings, at least for all intents and purposes and for discovery purposes, unless there's an objection to that.

But, Mr. Buchal, do you have an objection to that, while I also wait for Mr. Kaempf to make his decision in the next few days or weeks?

Go ahead, Mr. Buchal.
MR. BUCHAL: Yes. I wanted to apologize for not stating our position in the email yesterday. Obviously, there's questions of law and fact in common. The issue arises under Hall v. Hall of how do we keep the separateness of the cases and maintain the separate character and which pieces do we glue together? And there are substantial differences between our case and the OFF case. They have two claims; we have one. We have what we think is a simple claim that can be resolved quickly and maybe on summary judgment. We have sort of a different approach to litigating it. They have this takings thing that could cause delay and prejudice to us, we think.

The other issue is the "Aire" case or "Eyre" -- I don't know how to pronounce it -- was filed yesterday, and it has the magazine claims and the permit to purchase claims in one case. And then later today, before 5:00, pursuant to an agreement
with the State or a demand by the State, I will be filing a different permit to purchase case.

So at that point, we will have four cases. Two of them are -- the pure magazine case, Fitz; the OFF case, which is magazine and facial permit to purchase; the Eyre case, which is everything; and the new case, whose name I can't pronounce, the plaintiff, which will be just permit to purchase.

So figuring out how to glue these things together and so forth and so on seems to me like something we shouldn't do on the spot. So my thought was that, when you send us together to set up the preliminary injunction schedule, why don't you have us also present to you a plan for what the consolidation would look like that we think makes sense? And it might go beyond just Rule 48 (a) consolidation to a Rule 48 -- excuse me -42 (b) bifurcation too, to try and maybe to get all the like issues in two different hearings in some useful way, but we really haven't had a chance to talk about it. And so it was on that basis we thought that a formal consolidation decision today would be premature.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Buchal. I appreciate your clarifying that, and I do think that's an excellent suggestion.

So I will have the parties confer. Again, it doesn't have to occur immediately, but I just want to make sure I'm not wasting judicial resources by having four -- now what I hear is four different cases, but also your resources and discovery
resources from staff who have to come up with all the discovery. So I want to make sure we streamline as much as possible.

But I do recognize that you raise some very good points, Mr. Buchal, about some pieces should be -- either be separate or consolidated or handled in a way that the parties have a chance to think about.

So that's -- that's what -- I'll leave it up to you to confer, and just get back to me at some point so we don't have multiple hearings.

Mr. Kaempf, did you want to say anything?
MR. KAEMPF: Yeah. Just to conclude with that -- in talking about the different cases, if I could, just for the record, that I didn't spend a lot of time on this orally, but we do in our motion make clear that we make both a facial and an as-applied challenge to 114 . So that is in the record.

Thank you, Judge.
THE COURT: All right. I know the Eyre folks -- do I have somebody here on the Eyre case?

Let me do this: I -- we just want to do scheduling for that. Why don't I have you confer with defendants. I don't know that I'm going to hold a hearing in that case because of the untimeliness of filing the TRO right before the statute goes into effect, but have you all had a chance. What I -- I think what I would like to do is recess now -- I have to give
folks a break -- and then have you come back at 1:00, if you would like to talk to me about it, or we can do a phone call.

MR. MARSHALL: I think proceeding at 1:00 would be great if that works for Mr. Buchal's schedule. I did make an offer to Mr. Buchal that if -- if -- that, in our view, the boat for plaintiff seeking this relief on this particular setting ends at 5:00 tonight. And so if they are under the wire at 5:00 tonight with a preliminary injunction on the same -- on the same terms, that -- that they are able to be part of that boat and can be a part of one of these multiparty hearings, but we would object if they file after 5:00 p.m. tonight.

So if Mr. Buchal or Mr. Bergstrom are available to represent -- I assume Mr. Bergstrom is associated with Mr. Buchal for the other case as well. If they can represent those plaintiffs, the -- in the case to come, I would just like to coordinate all the schedules on that. We will -- yes, I'm happy to return at 1:00 p.m.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Buchal?
MR. BUCHAL: Mr. Bergstrom is not in the other case yet because it hasn't been filed yet. I can be available at 1:00 p.m. I need to turn into a pumpkin at 5:00 p.m. because of my mother's 90 birthday I have to take her to; but it sounds to me like coming back in an hour is no problem.

THE COURT: Why don't we say 1:30 so you can actually
have a chance to confer also, and then let me know at least what your proposal is.

And, again, I'm not positive I'm going to do a hearing in that case, but I'll hear -- hear what your views are on scheduling and how this is all going to fit in.

MR. MARSHALL: One thing that would help the conferral is just to know the Court's schedule. I notice that you have a three-day criminal jury trial starting on Tuesday is what was on the website this morning, and I -- it -- whether Tuesday and Wednesday are or are not available.

THE COURT: I am actually not here all next week.
MR. MARSHALL: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: So we would be -- any hearings would be remote and either extremely early for you all or extremely late for me.

MR. MARSHALL: Okay.
MR. KAEMPF: Thank you, Judge.
May I clarify on this coming back at 1:30?
THE COURT: You are not involved in that; so you do not need to come back.

MR. KAEMPF: I appreciate that. Thank you.
THE COURT: You're welcome to come as any member of the public.

MR. KAEMPF: No, I understand. I'm not being ordered.

THE COURT: No. Just in terms of the schedule, you don't need to be here. Mr. Bergstrom, totally up to you. I just -- and, again, $I$ could do it by phone if that's easier. I just want you to confer and propose a briefing schedule on the Eyre case, and then Mr. Buchal can tell us whether there will be another case filed by 5:00 p.m. or not.

So with that, we'll be in recess.
Thank you, everybody.
MR. KAEMPF: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. MARSHALL: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. BERGSTROM: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. BUCHAL: Thank you Your Honor.
MR. WILSON: Thank you, Your Honor.
(Hearing concluded.)

> C E R T I F I C A T E
> Case No. $2: 22-\mathrm{CV}-01815-\mathrm{IM}$
> and
> Case No. $3: 22-\mathrm{CV}-01859-\mathrm{IM}$
> Temporary Restraining Order Hearing December 2,2022

I certify, by signing below, that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the record, taken by stenographic means, of the proceedings in the above-entitled cause. A transcript without an original signature, conformed signature, or digitally signed signature is not certified.
/s/Jill L. Jessup, CSR, RMR, RDR, CRR, CRC

Official Court Reporter Signature Date: 12/6/2022
Oregon CSR No. 98-0346 CSR Expiration Date: 9/30/2023

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